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[P]roblems of welfare economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of 
aesthetics and morals. 
—Ronald Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost”1 
 
True enough, thought I . . . old black-letter, thou reasonest well. 
   —Herman Melville, Moby-Dick2 
INTRODUCTION 
We yearn for meaning but its material is hard to source.  Once trusted 
suppliers are now examples of suspect ones.  Religion is not believable.  Art 
is sublime but not operational.  Politics is patronizing.  The culture is a mess.  
Baseball is gone to analytics.  Material progress advances, formal ethical 
analysis advances, but the human spirit lags behind.  This is a problem of the 
greatest importance.  To concern ourselves with meaning is no luxury 
endeavor.  It is a core need.  Without it, human beings suffer terribly and die 
miserably.3 
Law is no panacea, but it is undervalued as a source of value.  This Essay 
proposes that corporate law in particular can be a potent resource for the 
formation of meaning in our minds and in our lives.  Here, I am not after the 
meaning of life, in the sense of coming to a certain substantive conclusion; 
e.g., “the meaning of life is 42.”4  Our modern conception is that the meaning 
 
*  Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law.  This Essay was prepared for the 
Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center 
for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019, at Fordham University School of Law.   
 
 1. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 43 (1960). 
 2. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK; OR THE WHALE 22 (Hershel Parker ed., W. W. 
Norton & Co. 2018) (1851) (footnote omitted). 
 3. See VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING:  AN INTRODUCTION TO 
LOGOTHERAPY (Ilse Lasch trans., 4th ed. 1992); see also BREE BUCHANAN & JAMES C. COYLE, 
THE PATH TO LAWYER WELL-BEING:  PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSITIVE CHANGE 9–
10 (2017), https://lawyerwellbeing.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Lawyer-Wellbeing-
Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SEN8-V8UP] (drawing on social psychology to emphasize 
meaning and purpose as core components of human well-being). 
 4. See DOUGLAS ADAMS, LIFE, THE UNIVERSE, AND EVERYTHING (1982) (concluding that 
the meaning of life is 42 in an absurdist novel). 
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of life is not to be found in the form of a singular answer.  Our search for 
significance is not the pursuit of a destination but is instead a journey, a 
process, that continually makes meaning as we undertake it.  Here, I pursue 
a practical search for “meaning” as a sense of life that gives us a working 
favor over nihilism and despair, boredom and nothingness.  I am concerned 
with trying-out an approach to thinking about and feeling life which can 
generate engagement, interest, energy, enthusiasm, and happiness:  in a word, 
meaning.5 
I.  WHY CORPORATE LAW? 
Our institutions constrain us.  That is one of the primary functions, for 
example, of law as social contract.  But our institutions also enable us to 
transcend personal limitations that we could not get past on our own.  Law, 
for example again, can enliven people in noncoercive, personally liberating 
ways.  In the jargon of contemporary legal theory, law can be morally 
“enabling” by providing a “menu” of ethical possibilities which become 
salient and encouraging through the majesty of law’s presence and 
credibility.6  An older vocabulary would say that the law is enmeshed with 
paideic qualities.7  Aristotle said that tragedy shows humanity as better than 
it is, and comedy as worse.8  When we see ourselves in the latter and shudder, 
the former gives us a path to turn to after the laughter gives out.  This I think 
is true of the fiduciary law I explore here.  Its dictates describe a way of life 
that is more impressive than the lives lived by those who come to it, but, 
having come to it, we may get better than we were. 
 
 5. My description of this as an “existential project” follows Roberto Unger’s usage:  
“[b]y an existential project I mean an individual’s view of how he can live in a way that gives 
a measure of sense, unity, and value to the course of his life.”  ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
PASSION:  AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 47 (1984).  This Essay is the first piece of a larger project 
exploring the existential significance of corporate law.  Here, I will introduce the nature of the 
project and set out some of its foundational themes.  Complexities, contradictions, retreats, 
and further advances will be rendered in subsequent installments, presently in progress. 
 6. See generally Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006) (analyzing the 
use of menus in legal regimes); Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus 
Do?:  An Empirical Analysis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279 (2009) (showing that explicitly 
offering takeover defenses as menu options in corporate law statutes causes more firms to 
adopt them, even though such defenses are also lawful when not specified as options in the 
statutes). 
 7. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability:  Rethinking Corporate 
Fiduciary Law’s Relevance to Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 513–14 (2000) (“[I]n applying 
corporate fiduciary law to individual cases, courts have not shied away from constructing such 
standards in terms of expressly personal and moral commitments on the directors’ parts.  In 
undertaking this work of paideia, corporate fiduciary law (and fiduciary law generally) has 
assumed some of the ‘valence’ of the criminal law. . . .  [I]t has been the special role, the 
unique nature and function of corporate fiduciary law to speak expressly to the importance of 
supporting norms of managerial trustworthiness.”).  See generally LYNN A. STOUT, 
CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE:  HOW GOOD LAW MAKES GOOD PEOPLE (2011) (using behavioral 
research to propose ways that the law can help cultivate ethical decision-making in various 
contexts). 
 8. See ARISTOTLE, Poetics, in A NEW ARISTOTLE READER 540, 541 (J. L. Ackrill ed., 
1987). 
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Much of what I have to say here relates to the agency law dimensions of 
corporate law.  A comprehensive exploration of these themes would need to 
canvass the full expanse of the fiduciary realm.  But I regard it as especially 
important, and potent, to conceive of this existential project as being about 
corporate law.  First, corporations are fundamental, powerful institutions in 
our civilization today.  They therefore are, or ought to be, at the core of our 
concerns about how society is operating, what is wrong with it, and what we 
want to be better.  Any existential project that does not address the 
corporation near to its heart threatens to be nostalgic, or escapist.  A long 
tradition of secular humanists have drawn on religious canon to formulate 
and express secular, even anti-religious, insights.9  I draw here on the liturgy 
of corporate law to make personal, even anti-corporate, ethical contributions 
to our postmodern existential predicament.  We live in a corporate world so 
we will use it.10 
Because corporate law is controversial, it has the attention of both its 
supporters and detractors.  This attention can be nudged to adjacent concerns.  
If you love corporate law already, this project will let that love run deeper 
and make it more personally actionable than is suggested by canonical 
corporate law discourses.  If you hate corporate law, I will show some depths 
of its power that may change your way of thinking about it.  I will also 
suggest how that power can be redirected to change corporate law for the 
better. 
Finally, it is the mysterious nature of the corporation which makes it an 
especially attractive site for existential inquiry.  We who have thought hard 
about it cannot even say once and for all what a corporation is, or in what 
sense it should be said to exist.11  Yet we know that it is powerful.  Like all 
human creations, the corporation must reflect something of ourselves.  We 
look to the corporation because it has been so successful.  There must be 
something in its design that is useful.  We look to the corporation because it 
 
 9. See generally THE ENDURING LEGACY:  BIBLICAL DIMENSIONS IN MODERN 
LITERATURE (Douglas C. Brown ed., 1975) (collecting and analyzing celebrated examples of 
this). 
 10. Many studies have shown that lawyers in general suffer unhappiness at rates 
surpassing the general population and surpassing rates seen in other professions. See 
BUCHANAN & COYLE, supra note 3, at 47 (describing the report of the National Task Force on 
Lawyer Well-Being).  It is often thought that corporate lawyers are especially vulnerable to a 
void of meaning in their lives. See Lance McMillian, Tortured Souls:  Unhappy Lawyers 
Viewed Through the Medium of Film, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 31, 38–41 (2009) 
(canvassing depictions of “soullessness” in corporate lawyering).  This Essay is trying for an 
antidote and shows that, to the contrary, corporate lawyers are poised to serve as an existential 
vanguard through their proximity to corporate law. 
 11. See Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1095 
(2002) (“[A]t other times, the corporation-thing falls away and we experience a kind of 
ontological crash—we have lost the identity of the thing we were supposedly talking about.”).  
See generally John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 
YALE L.J. 65 (1926).  Compare the ineffability of the corporation to the strong intuitive 
conceptions that we have of contract or real property. See generally Joan Williams, The 
Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1988) (describing and critiquing the intuitive idea 
of real property). 
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is so destructive.  There must be some warning within it that we must tell 
ourselves. 
It is not my intention here to assess corporate law as it operates “in the 
trenches” (or the tranches).  Instead, I want to encourage an interpretation of 
corporate law, a way of being moved by corporate law, that can help us to a 
better life.  A better sentiment of life.  In Moby-Dick, the narrator Ishmael 
says that it is the French painters who best capture the spirit of the whale hunt 
in action, even though the French have far less presence in the whale fishery 
than do the Americans or the British.12  American painters miss the essence 
of whaling, he implies, not despite but because of their immersion in the 
industry.  American paintings are too technically and mechanically precise 
to raise the deeper truths of what whaling is all about.13  So too may legal 
theory say what corporate law is like without detailing the particulars of the 
darted irons and the bloody spray.  Ethics must address the practical world 
through perspectives and categories that are outside of it, otherwise it risks 
patronizing the world it really wants to engage.  There is more in corporate 
law than bread alone, we must consecrate its spiritual use. 
This is not to say that corporate law has an exclusive claim to excellence 
as an existential device.  It is only to say that it is a promising one.  There is 
not just one way of making things good or making things awful, and so there 
is a moral landscape, with many peaks and valleys.14  I mean this as an 
experiment that might be undertaken in other areas of law, and other areas of 
professional and social life.  This project is an existential reconnoiter of the 
mountain of corporate law, a high mountaintop, which, once climbed will 
reveal its top as a false peak:  we can go still higher. 
This Essay explores corporate law as a source for generating meaning in 
the course of a good individual life.   But the personal is political.  The 
resource that I aim to unleash has broad normative potential.  If tapped, it 
could yield the vision and energy required to achieve a reform of law, and 
corporate law in particular, that might render it more socially and 
existentially desirable.  Wanting to know what corporate law can do for me 
or you is wrapped up in the question of what we can do, and might better 
know how to do, for society. 
II.  IT IS ABOUT CONNECTION 
We cannot say what it is like to be, for example, a bat.15  For humans, we 
can say.  Or dare say.  With Roberto Unger, I “gamble[] on the idea that we 
can develop an account of our basic human identity that is neither trivial nor 
 
 12. MELVILLE, supra note 2, at 209–11. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See generally SAM HARRIS, THE MORAL LANDSCAPE:  HOW SCIENCE CAN DETERMINE 
HUMAN VALUES (2010) (defending this view). 
 15. See generally Thomas Nagel, What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, 83 PHIL. REV. 435 (1974) 
(concluding that we cannot know). 
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fatally beholden to the preconceptions of a particular culture.”16  We can start 
by understanding that for us the most important meaning emerges in the 
course of our relationships with other people.  No person is an island entire 
of itself.17  Poets, anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, theologians, 
artists—the full ecumenical “priesthood of the imagination”18—agree that 
the answer (an answer) to existential dread lies in the creation of meaning 
through the ways we connect with others.19  This is why Sartre said, “Hell is 
other people.”20  Terrible as everyone is, there is really no escaping them, 
except into something worse.  Worse is the dehumanization of isolation.  
What we are primarily concerned with is other people.  If we are to have 
meaning, and improved meaning, in our lives, we must be “involved in 
mankind.”21  Corporate law can show us how. 
In an important article, Peter Gabel argued that while we have a core desire 
for union and intimacy with others, we are afraid of this desire.  We avoid, 
evade, and undermine it, and, he claimed, we do so especially through law.22  
Gabel’s idea is that law and legal relationships function as a framework, a 
thing in consciousness, around which we execute our intention to divert from 
our core desire for intimacy and instead present ourselves to each other in 
less vulnerable ways.23  We insert legal institutions into our imaginations in 
order to conceive of our alienation as dictated and “official.”  Making our 
alienation “official” both explains it and gives us a masochistic confidence 
that it will always be there.  According to Gabel, this “conspiracy of 
withdrawn selves” can be seen in (for lawyers) “their glassy eyes and rigid 
posture,” or in the slight delays in speech by which other people assure us 
 
 16. UNGER, supra note 5, at 21.  The critical legal studies movement did not, as is 
sometimes rumored, take the view that “everything” is “socially constructed.”  To the 
contrary, this literature often worked with a very definite, even essentialist conception of what 
people are like, psychologically and spiritually.  That conception is to me usually more 
resonant and workable than the abstract, sterile characterizations of human beings found either 
in conventional law and economics, or in the law and social psychology counterrevolution.  
My method is to deploy what it is useful from each of these traditions, and ignore what is not. 
 17. See generally JOHN DONNE, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, in DEVOTIONS UPON 
EMERGENT OCCASIONS AND DEATH’S DUEL 1, 17 (Izaak Walton ed., Vintage Books 1999) 
(1624). 
 18. LIONEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY 91 (1972) (citing but apparently not 
quoting William Wordsworth). 
 19. See generally Doug McAdam, On the Existential Function of the Social and the Limits 
of Rationalist Accounts of Human Behavior, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 225, 232 (2016) (“[W]e 
function as existential co-conspirators, relentlessly—if generally unconsciously— exchanging 
affirmations that sustain our sense of our own significance and our lives inherent 
meaningfulness.”). 
 20. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 45 (S. Gilbert trans., Vintage 
Books 1989). 
 21. See generally DONNE, supra note 17, at 17. 
 22. Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the 
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (1984). 
 23. Gabel calls this a “descriptive assertion” that is evident “for an historical reason that 
remains somewhat obscure.” Id. at 1566–67.  He drops a footnote which points to a Marxist 
explanation:  that scarcity makes everyone look like a threat or an instrument. Id. at 1567 n.9.  
Gabel himself rejects this explanation because scarcity has always been with humanity but 
alienation, in his view, has not. Id. at 1566–67, 1567 n.9. 
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“that they are in some sense not here with us.”24  Gabel rues this widespread 
conspiracy because it causes so much of our lives to “lack any sense of the 
immediacy and contingency of truly lived encounters.”25 
My view is really the reverse of Gabel’s.  Our desire for meaning is too 
massive, and unbound, and our creativity too unstructured, and our minds too 
cluttered, to concretize our yearning for connection and relation on our own. 
So we do it through existential “mediating hierarchs,” to borrow a phrase, 
among which is legal imagination.  Gabel claims we deny our desire for 
connection by hiding in roles that the law makes official.  My point is the 
opposite—we are clumsy and shy and unartful, but through our legal 
imagination we can conceive of roles and feed on lines that facilitate 
connection.  We need this mechanism of encounter, and we have it. 
I promise that this is not to say that we must have, in our workspaces or 
elsewhere, open floor plans, or face time, or meetings, or coffees or lunches, 
or chitchat.  Anyone can have those things if they want them, but you do not 
need them for this existential project.  Corporate existentialism is not against 
being alone, it is only against loneliness.  This is not really about professional 
arrangements.  It is about how we think and feel about our lives.  I am talking 
about an ethics, an approach to consciousness, imagination, and a sentiment 
of being.  This is happening only in your mind, and you may also find it 
happening in your life. 
III.  GETTING AFTER IT 
While corporate theorists ponder about what the corporation is, the 
corporate law gets right into the process of becoming, by specifying in section 
141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law that “the corporation shall 
be managed by a board of directors.”26  If meaning is found through 
engagement, through iteration, then the injunction to move, to do it, is a first 
ethical principle of a good existential project.  And this first principle is well 
elaborated in corporate law.27  The fact that corporate boards have a duty to 
act is one of the reasons corporations are so often more effective than natural 
people.  Corporations have to be managed, while people often abide a 
vacancy in the central offices.  This simple principle describes a core ethic of 
a good life.  You cannot just sit there like a lump on a log.  Do not regard this 
as merely enabling, or as clarifying that you may be managed.  There is more 
 
 24. Id. at 1575. 
 25. Id. at 1575–76. 
 26. It goes without saying (although I now say it) that by corporate law I mean the 
Delaware General Corporation Law, the most widely used and thought about corporate law in 
the United States. See John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345 (2012) 
(describing and explaining Delaware’s dominance in corporate law). 
 27. This exhortation is also core to the lawyer’s fiduciary obligations.  A lawyer should 
“pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (emphasis added).  It will not suffice for the lawyer to 
abide by the technical rules and advance a cause mechanically or reactively.  Rather, the 
lawyer must “act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal 
in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.” Id.  The lawyer must show some oomph. 
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in it than that.  Private ordering will come, there will be plenty of chances to 
choose your own way.  But you will not have occasion to forge your own 
path until you are moving.  Yet neither is this quite command.  “Shall be 
managed” is prophecy.  The duty of care is the self-fulfilling prophecy of 
corporate existentialism. 
This injunction to act must be regarded as opportunity, rather than 
burdensome responsibility.  It gives escape from slothfulness, a condition we 
call sinful because it is corrupting to what is beautiful and tending toward the 
divine in humanity.  Like all sinners, the sloth is ultimately a pitiable figure.  
Whatever private, professional, or social responsibilities she neglects, the 
worst of it she suffers herself in “the pain of idleness.”28  Melville’s Bartleby, 
the scrivener who “prefers not to” undertake the duties of the magistrate’s 
office in which he is employed, and does not undertake them, is not happy.29  
His eyes are glazed.30  He is miserable, neurotic, and finally dies of his 
nothingness.  A human being managing their life does not lose energy but 
rather gains it.  Emerson knew:  “Power . . . resides in the moment of 
transition from a past to a new state, in the shooting of the gulf, in the darting 
to an aim.”31  With just a mustard seed of “shall be managed,” you can move 
mountains.  Or at least begin a climb, and give your dinner the seasoning of 
appetite.  More than potent, trying is joyful.  The face of oomph is a smile, 
or better.32  “Energy is Eternal Delight,” wrote Mr. Blake.33  This is the secret 
profit of agency that cannot be disgorged. 
In this existential project, we see coming and then duck the hard questions 
concerning freedom of will, as against deterministic forces.  Are we free to 
move ourselves, or was it all dictated in the register of the Big Bang?  
Corporate law gives a practical ethics, for practical men and women.  We are 
after meaning, not truth.  We can be big in life even if we are little in 
understanding.  So we move at Delaware’s command to act and “write on the 
lintels of the door-post, Whim.  I hope it is somewhat better than whim at 
last, but we cannot spend the day in explanation.”34 
This is audacious but it is not glib. The inequitably distributed privileges 
of social status, wealth, birth endowments, and luck make it easier for some 
 
 28. BOB DYLAN, Every Grain of Sand, on SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981). 
 29. HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY, THE SCRIVENER:  A STORY OF WALL-STREET 
(Mockingbird Classics Publ’g 2017) (1853). 
 30. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text in which Gabel says that our 
(purportedly) legally compelled “withdrawn selves” are evidenced by glassy eyes.  To my 
point, it is Bartelby’s refusal to scaffold his intimacy through the strictures of fiduciary duty 
that leaves his eyes glassy. 
 31. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, SELF-RELIANCE 23 (Logos Books 2019) (1841). 
 32. Early usage of “oomph” in the United States, in the first decades of the twentieth 
century, had an affirming sexual connotation. See Oomph, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131620?redirectedFrom=oomph& [https://perma.cc/ 
2UQN-TTG6] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020); see also In re an Application by La Marquise 
Footwear, Inc. [1947] 64 RPCTMC 27 at 29 (Eng.) (describing “oomph” as an informal term 
in the United States meaning sex appeal). 
 33. WILLIAM BLAKE, THE MARRIAGE OF HEAVEN AND HELL 5 (John W. Luce & Co. 1906) 
(1793). 
 34. EMERSON, supra note 31, at 12. 
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people, and harder for some people, to “go.”  This existential project is not a 
programmatic response to—and certainly not a reconciliation with—
established distributions of power and capability.  This is a personal ethics 
for the creation of meaning in the shadow of prevailing arrangements, which 
meaning might enable a reformative impulse to emerge out of the shadow 
and strike for social justice. 
Neither is this a substitute for health care.  I am addressing a sentiment of 
being, in whatever idiom ethics properly operates distinctly from the realm 
of medical diagnosis and treatment.  Readers suffering from depression or 
other mental illnesses are urged to seek medical attention.  Humbly it is my 
hope that they may find in this Essay some resource of persistence that may 
aid them to keep seeking it, despite finding, as may be likely under current 
arrangements, that it is hard to get. 
A.  (Non)Judgment 
Among the hallowed precepts of corporate law is the business judgment 
rule.  Under this rule, corporate directors who make deliberate, unconflicted 
business decisions are insulated from personal liability though the decision 
turns out badly, or even disastrously, for the firm.  Directors are not held to 
a standard of ordinary prudence.  If they meet the standards of the business 
judgment rule, they can make unusual, offbeat, or weird choices that differ 
from industry norms without exposing themselves to a stickable charge of 
wrongdoing.  The idea of the business judgment rule is existentially 
promising.  We will not say that you should do what most people are doing 
or what is usually done.  We do not say how or where exactly to move. We 
only say:  go.  Do what you think is best, the best you can, and, if you act in 
good faith, we do not judge you and you will not judge yourself. 
A crucial modern component to the business judgment rule is that we only 
grant its protections if a decision was informed.35  It is not enough to be 
properly motivated.  You must also make an effort to know and think things 
through the relevant facts.  The world is a certain way, it works in a certain 
way.  We cannot perfectly know it, nor know how our behavior will affect it, 
or the people in it.  But we have to make an effort to find out, to understand 
what is likely to happen, and to base our decisions about our own behavior 
on our evaluation of the available evidence.  We do not have to keep our nose 
in the social statistics all day.  But the responsibility to look and think before 
we act is a principle of realism, of modernity, that must be satisfied, if you 
are to escape judgmental scrutiny.  This responsibility redounds as existential 
opportunity.  To be informed and deliberate you must be continually engaged 
with others, making your mind and opinion vulnerable to influence by them, 
trusting them, as you must, if you are going to be open to changing your 
mind, as you must be open, before you can receive business judgment rule 
protection.  The corporate life in this sense is the life of intimacy and 
vulnerability.  And in that kind of life is found the stuff of meaning. 
 
 35. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
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B.  Purpose 
But what should you be managing yourself for, or towards?  What I say 
here might be controversial intellectually, but not practically.  The Delaware 
corporate code says “get after it.”  What corporate directors are supposed to 
get after is profits for the shareholders.36  Directors do not have to think about 
what their purpose is.  Instead, they are to spend their time and energy coming 
up with the means of advancing their purpose.  This framework is 
commendable to the kind of existential project I am developing here.  Of 
course, I do not mean that you should maximize your own wealth, nor is it 
especially inspiriting to think in terms of “maximizing” utility or well-
being.37  Instead what I want to emphasize is that the existential project 
proposed here does not require you, or even really invite you, to struggle with 
purpose.  You do not need to think too much about the purpose of your life.  
The purpose is given, more or less.  The purpose is as described in the default 
expectations of our culture:  work hard and honest, be a good friend, spouse, 
mother, sister, father, brother, son, daughter, citizen, community member, 
consumer, relax and be happy, exercise, be socially responsible, worship, 
keep your vices in check but not so much that they manifest as neurosis.  That 
sort of thing.  An existential project, or this existential project, should be 
concerned with surfacing the means to pursue these default purposes.  The 
point is that people should not really see their existential task as figuring out 
the purpose of their life.  Rather, they should regard the path to meaning as 
running through the course of discovering the best means—their best 
means—towards accomplishing the purpose that is implicit in what they are 
as humans in this society. 
Now as to this there must be freedom of escape.  As in corporate law, 
people can widely deviate even from the core default rules and establish 
whatever heterodox purpose they desire.38  But they must do so explicitly.  
Otherwise they will be held by others, and will hold themselves, to the 
ordinary standard and will suffer confusion, despondency, and misery within 
the conventional idiom.  There are forms of life that allow for maximal 
private ordering.  However, there is greater risk in them, they are less tried, 
 
 36. See DAVID YOSIFON, CORPORATE FRICTION:  HOW CORPORATE LAW IMPEDES 
AMERICAN PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 60–96 (2018) (specifying “the actual law of 
corporate purpose”). 
 37. In other work I have repudiated the shareholder primacy norm as socially destructive, 
and urged that it be replaced with a more socially responsible corporate governance command. 
See id.  Nothing in this Essay should be read to contradict that position or vindicate shareholder 
primacy.  Instead, this should be read as an effort to see what is valuable in corporate law 
despite the odious shareholder primacy principle that currently occupies it, and as an effort to 
show how that value can be exploited even before shareholder primacy is overcome. 
 38. See generally Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?:  A Political and Economic 
Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 543–45 (1990) (discussing mutability in corporate law 
generally, but not addressing mutability of purpose); Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, 
Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties:  A Response to the Anti-contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1, 
2–6 (1990) (responding to Black and others); David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder 
Primacy:  Is the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461 (2017) 
(discussing the mutability of corporate purpose under Delaware law). 
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and many people will be reluctant to invest in or deal easily with you unless 
you share the default ideas concerning what life is all about. 
C.  Loyalty 
A principal must risk being used or manipulated if it would chance to gain 
the benefits that a faithful agent can deliver.  The duty of loyalty is the 
generative salve we put on this gash of vulnerability in fiduciary 
relationships.  Corporate law prescribes a duty of loyalty that compels 
directors to put the interests of the corporation and its shareholders first and 
to not allow their own self-interest to get in the way of serving the corporate 
purpose.39   This kind of giving and receiving of loyalty may ready us for the 
deeper responsibilities, and opportunities, that more intimate vulnerability 
can present. 
The law’s most hallowed exposition of the duty of loyalty comes from the 
case of Meinhard v. Salmon,40 in which Judge Benjamin Cardozo wrote that 
a fiduciary owes to their charge “[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive,”41 and that fiduciary loyalty requires “thought of 
self . . . to be renounced, however hard the abnegation.”42  Meinhard and 
Salmon were partners in a real estate venture.  Near the end of the lease on 
their property, Salmon, the managing partner, arranged a new deal, in his 
own name, on his own account, to develop the property and adjacent land 
under a new lease.43  Meinhard sued, alleging a fiduciary violation, and 
Cardozo held that Salmon breached his duty of loyalty in taking the new deal 
for himself.44  It was turned over to their partnership.45 
In an essay asking “Must Salmon Love Meinhard?,”46 Professor Stephen 
Bainbridge answers in the negative, finding decisive limits to loyalty 
obligations in agency law doctrine that do not require agapic, self-sacrificing 
love from the agent to the principal.  “So much for renouncing thought of 
self,” writes Bainbridge.47  If agape is not actually the standard, then what is 
the agapic language doing in this touchstone opinion?  Bainbridge concludes 
that it sets out an aspirational ideal, as Delaware opinions often do today, 
praising or condemning corporate directors’ conduct even where formal 
liability is not implicated.48  For our existential purpose, I want us to regard 
this kind of fiduciary dicta as an invitation to, and an incantation of, the deep 
 
 39. While purpose is mutable, see supra note 39 and accompanying text, loyalty is 
mandatory for corporate directors; it cannot be waived by private ordering within a corporate 
charter.  But the law can be broken. See infra text accompanying notes 60–70 (discussing the 
power of the fiduciary breach). 
 40. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
 41. Id. at 546. 
 42. Id. at 548. 
 43. Id. at 546. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Must Salmon Love Meinhard?, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 257 (2014). 
 47. Id. at 265. 
 48. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:  How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997). 
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power that is available if we give ourselves over to the loyalty relationship.  
“[C]ast your dancing spell my way/ I promise to go under it.”49 
This is to say that among the good pleasures is the big meaningful feeling 
of loyalty.  Not the receipt of it, but the giving of it.  Such is the strange 
alchemy of loyalty that it pays back to the soul more than it costs the ego.  
The great educator Booker T. Washington understood this effect.  In Up from 
Slavery, he wrote:  “Few things help an individual more than to place 
responsibility upon him, and to let him know that you trust him.”50  There is 
personal power to be gained, not in the slack of the agency relationship but 
in the torque of loyalty given hard and true.  This is the truth of the human 
condition:  “Every individual responds to confidence.”51  The commitment 
to putting something before ourselves does not diminish us:  it elevates us.  
Loyalty does not just forbid us from our own narrow self-interest, it liberates 
us from it.  We look in the mirror and see what we were meant to be.  
Washington, born into slavery, generated his insight in the conditions of 
extreme deprivation that attended emancipation.  He found a key to human 
nature that can generate meaning even within desolation.52 
By requiring us to restrain ourselves, the duty of loyalty gives us a better 
idea of what we really are, and what is worthwhile about us.  This reaches at 
the deeper philosophical questions, and corporate law helps us grasp the 
answers. Just as our moral wisdom says there is no single meaning of life, 
but instead that meaning emerges through processes, so too does our best 
wisdom say there really is no single, constant you, no singular self, to be 
discovered and vindicated once and for all.  This is what the Buddhists, the 
postmodernists, and the social psychologists all say:  the sense of a core and 
abiding dispositional self is an illusion, an ephemeral subjectivity generated 
by the unmoored discourses that “thought dreams” pass through our minds.  
There is no inveterate, unchanging ground of authentic selfhood to stand 
firmly on, and the trying to do so is bound to give you vertigo.  As the Nobel 
laureate Bob Dylan has repeatedly emphasized:  “the point of life is not to 
discover who you are, the point of life is to create who you are.”53 
Polonius is the fool when he says “to thine own self be true.”54  What 
washes up in the heart or mind is not you, and is not necessarily a truth worth 
having.  When we say “be true to yourself” what we really mean is hew to 
what the black letter says you are, not what you find yourself being in the 
 
 49. BOB DYLAN, Mr. Tambourine Man, on BRINGING IT ALL BACK HOME (Columbia 
Records 1965). 
 50. BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, UP FROM SLAVERY:  AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 172 (1901). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See generally FRANKL, supra note 3 (describing how he survived the Nazi death camps 
and the qualities he witnessed in others who survived). 
 53. See ROLLING THUNDER REVUE:  A BOB DYLAN STORY BY MARTIN SCORSESE (Grey 
Water Park Productions 2019).  Dylan has been making this point for more than fifty years:  
“I’m ready for to fade / Into my own parade.” DYLAN, supra note 49. 
 54. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 1, sc. 3, l. 78 (David Bevington et al. eds., 
Bantam Books 1988). 
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trenches.  By our “true self” we really mean our “best self,” and our “best 
self” is archetypal:  restatement visions we may ensoul.55 
Loyalty is a way of getting past yourself as you are and getting instead to 
something better.  It is not just alright but imperative to escape from yourself 
in the pursuit of a meaningful life.  This is why Oscar Wilde is not just clever 
but profound when he writes:  “The first duty in life is to be as artificial as 
possible.  What the second duty is no one has yet discovered.”56  The mask 
of agency is valuable not because it frees you to say what you really think, 
the mask is valuable because it frees you from saying what you really think. 
The importance of being earnest, it turns out, is nil.  And, as Lionel Trilling 
concludes, “if ‘existence’ is responded to as if it were less than totally in 
ernest, Spirit is the less bound by it. It can then without sadness accept 
existence, and without resentment transact such business with it as is 
necessary.”57 
You cannot be free of your authorial self-conception simply by making a 
philosophically or scientifically grounded decision to ignore it.  Getting past 
yourself is a process.  Before you can be free of that fiction, you must first 
be attentive to it and see as clearly as you can the truth of its falsity.  In 
meditation this is done through quiet, still, focused observation of the 
“thought dreams” and disidentifying with them.58  It can also be 
accomplished with the use of psychedelics.59  But meditation is hard for 
householders, and psychedelics are even harder.  The duty of loyalty provides 
a direct and practicable way out of the illusions of solipsistic self-narration.  
The introspection required by the law of loyalty helps us to see our narrative 
selves more clearly and then to understand the fleeting nature of what we see.  
The fiduciary obligation to confess personal conflicts at first may lend greater 
reality to those truths, which might otherwise have laid only half-alive in our 
minds.60  But then the obligation to strike out or constrain these conflicting 
elements of personality vindicates the truth that they are not really us, we are 
separate from them, and can wear them or put them aside.  “The truths of 
metaphysics are the truths of masks,” said Oscar Wilde.61 
But what should we find meaning in loyalty to?  To say that you are loyal 
implies that you are an agent to some principal.  I am not exactly reaching 
here to fortify the particular relationships of your life, although of course they 
can be nourishing when well cultivated.  I am trying to show how the loyalty 
 
 55. See TRILLING, supra note 18, at 5. 
 56. OSCAR WILDE, Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young, in THE WRITINGS 
OF OSCAR WILDE 140, 141 (1907). 
 57. TRILLING, supra note 18, at 121. 
 58. See generally SWAMI JANAKANANDA SARASWATI (THE SOURCE OF BLISS), YOGA, 
TANTRA AND MEDITATION IN DAILY LIFE (1991) (a practical guide). 
 59. See MICHAEL POLLAN, HOW TO CHANGE YOUR MIND:  WHAT THE NEW SCIENCE OF 
PSYCHEDELICS TEACHES US ABOUT CONSCIOUSNESS, DYING, ADDICTION, DEPRESSION, AND 
TRANSCENDENCE (2018) (a practical guide). 
 60. Just as Foucault saw that the injunction to confess forbidden sexual desires helped 
flesh out and give bigger life to those desires. See generally 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). 
 61. OSCAR WILDE, Oscariana, in THE WRITINGS OF OSCAR WILDE, supra note 56, at 1, 23. 
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conception can help generate a meaningful sentiment of being, in your own 
head, irrespective of whether you serve on a board, have clients, are married, 
or coach youth soccer.  We are going to do what we do.  Work, take care of 
our children, eat, play, sleep, whatever.  What is subject to alteration is how 
we think about it. The liturgy of loyalty, I am urging, can be tapped in the 
imagination of a way of life.  You are vulnerable, you need somebody to 
trust, and you can trust yourself.  Be loyal to your endeavor. 
IV.  TRANSFORMATION:  SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AS PERSONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 
This existential project is not complacent, it is not an ideology of the status 
quo.  A big human life must involve openness not just to tinkering but to 
transformation. Meaning understood in terms of process necessarily involves 
dynamism and possibility. I want to illustrate this with reference to an idea 
of social responsibility and how it informs and may be served by corporate 
existentialism. 
Start with the idea that society is a construct, in the deepest sense.  What 
else would it be?  Its terms are not discovered under any microscope nor 
revealed on top of any mountain.  The institutions, structures, and types of 
relationships we have now are not necessary, they are only ever provisional.  
The truth of this “anti-necessitarianism” is hard to deny, but harder to believe.  
We understand it as a formal principle but are easily lulled into necessitarian 
thinking by our psychological status quo bias, polemicists, and the “the 
idolatry of the actual.”62  Social responsibility must therefore involve the 
responsibility to continually remind ourselves and each other about what 
society is:  “[t]he idea of society includes the assumption that a given society 
can be changed if the judgment passed upon it is adverse.”63  Second, social 
responsibility must involve the actual passing of judgment on society.  Third, 
social responsibility must involve some effort to imagine alternatives against 
which the actual might be evaluated, or moved on from.  An existential 
project must be socially responsible in this sense, otherwise it cannot produce 
meaning in our modern terms of process and becoming. 
Corporate existentialism is socially responsible.  Having compelled you to 
be diligent and loyal, it has made you sober, healthy, and potent.  Having 
thrown off the shackles of self-interest, and empowered by the mysterious 
energy of loyalty, you are freed to transform from what you were.  If we are 
to be socially responsible, in the sense I have defined it here, our fiduciary 
commitments must have limits.  We must be poised to be disloyal to the 
meanings in which we are involved.  We must encourage in ourselves not the 
“heroism of dumb service”64 but agency as a mask, a loose mask, which can 
be taken off in favor of another mask, a new mask, that is more meaningful 
to us. 
 
 62. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, POLITICS:  THE CENTRAL TEXTS:  THEORY AGAINST 
FATE 371 (Zhiyuan Cui ed., 1997). 
 63. TRILLING, supra note 18, at 26. 
 64. Id. at 35 (discussing Hegel). 
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Here is where the core corporate law principle of volunteerism plays its 
crucial role.65  Notice I did not emphasize it at the beginning.  There the focus 
was on the injunction:  “shall act.”66  But corporate law also requires that you 
be voluntarily engaged in the meaning you are generating.  The elements of 
corporate life are always provisional, are only a mask, because of the rule 
that agency relationships must be voluntary.  This volunteerism is prior to 
and supersedes the duty of loyalty.  This is to say:  you can always breach.  
And maybe you should.  The future “cannot be colonized in advance.”67  The 
power and vulnerability dictated by the fiduciary opportunities of care and 
loyalty may generate any kind of new, unexpected meaning, and if it is 
heretical to fiduciary scriptures, so be it.  Something very different, very bold 
may come out.  Law is not the destination.  Law is the path.  What should 
corporate law become?  Who are you becoming? 
Beyond authorizing transformation, the approach adopted here can also 
help to enliven and quicken the transformative impulse.  Earlier I discussed 
Gabel’s idea that the law works in our imagination to make our alienation 
seem “official,” and therefore unalterable, to our shallow satisfaction but 
deeper dismay.68  If that does happen, then it is a badly educated legal 
imagination that allows it to happen.  An existential project committed to 
exploiting meaning available in corporate law can show the falsity of the 
conception that Gabel laments as so widespread.  From a corporate law 
perspective, legal relationships are clearly not permanent and unalterable.  
You do not choose your family and you barely choose your friends, but your 
fiduciary affections are voluntary.  Corporate existentialism can tutor 
dynamism and counsel means (and meanings) of escape in other areas of life.  
Gabel says that we use the law to represent “our false selves as legally 
compelled.”69  But I am emphasizing the core element of voluntariness in 
agency law, the opportunity for exit. With this knowledge in your head you 
cannot lapse into reveries of compulsory alienation.  Unger says that “[o]ur 
ideals and interests are nailed to the cross of the institutions and practices that 
represent them in fact.  The law is the site of this crucifixion.”70  But 
Golgotha is a holy place, not an evil place.  It is the place where redemption 
and renewal are initiated, not despite but through the crucifixion. 
 
 
 65. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005) (“Agency is the fiduciary 
relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (an 
‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, 
and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.” (emphasis added)). 
 66. See supra text accompanying notes 27–36. 
 67. Gabel, supra note 22, at 1581. 
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 23–26. 
 69. Gabel, supra note 22, at 1569. 
 70. UNGER, supra note 62, at 231. 
